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The judge of the Juvenile Court faces a unique problem
not shared by his fellow lawyers and judges. This problem
centers around the definition of his job. Just what is expected of a Juvenile Court judge? What is his role?
This unique, complex and confusing problem arises from
a number of sources. The primary confusion was built into
the position by some of the assumptions and limitations
found in the Juvenile Code under which he operates. These
assumptions and limitations existed at the time of the creation of the first Juvenile Courts and continue to exist today.
Legal scholars and historians formulate these assumptions
and limitations in a variety of ways,' but perhaps basic are
the following:
a. That by the 20th century the "humanitarian" view
had prevailed to such an extent that older concepts of retribution and punishment did not seem to be properly applied
to children.
b. That applying the common law concept of "responsibility" to all children over seven did not seem valid. Rather
an age of sixteen, seventeen or eighteen seemed to be more
correct in terms of the actual abilities and behavior of
children.
c. That children, as contrasted to adults, were still
young enough that they could be molded and changed so that
their behavior would conform to the minimum standards
established by society.
d. That sufficient scientific (or at least pragmatic)
knowledge about behavior existed in the various social
sciences and that this knowledge could be used to effectuate
a desired change of behavior in children.
e. That the most effective way for the state to implement these assumptions was to have the state act so "That
the care, custody and discipline of a child shall approximate
as nearly as 2may be that which should be given by its
parents...."
Specialized Courts
Based on these assumptions, the various states felt justiflied in establishing specialized courts. These courts, acting
under the state's power as parens patriae would be able to
"individualize justice" on the basis of treating and hopefully

changing the behavior of the child and not on the basis of
punishing the offense. The first directive then, given to the
Juvenile Court judge by the statute creating his job was to
treat each child on an individual basis in order to induce
the child to conform to the societal minimum.3
But the state, in implementing these assumptions, chose
as its vehicle the court. This choice was probably based on
the assumption that it was necessary to give coercive power
to the agency that was to effectuate the change. But this
was not the only basis. There was the competing value of
protecting society. Given that the behavior of the child

could and frequently did violate other values in society. the
state
wanted that behavior curtailed. Therefore the second
directive given by the state to the Juvenile Court judge was
that he was, in fact, to act like a judge. He was to exercise
the coercive power of the state to protect society.
These two basic directives, implicit in the legal structure of the Juvenile Court, obviously produce a built-in conflict for the judge in defining his role. At the same time he
is to individualize justice and protect society. These two
goals frequently force the judge into trying to serve two
masters.
But apart from this inherent built-in conflict, the Juvenile Court judge faces other role problems arising out of
the basic assumption about the court. The Juvenile Court
judge, in almost all cases, was trained to be and practiced
as a lawyer. This training and practice prepared him to be
a decision maker in terms of the traditional legal syllogism
of finding the facts, applying the proper legal rule and
rending the decision.
But this syllogism is of little help to the Juvenile Court
judge. He rarely has a problem of determining what arethe
"facts" and what is the law to be applied. Many commentators have pointed out, and properly so, 4 that the courts
should be careful in all cases to make sure that the child
has committed the delinquent act before it purports to render a decision. However, the Juvenile Court judge seldom
has this fact-rule problem. In almost all cases the child has
admitted the delinquency. Consequently, his job is that of
a decision maker under the legal rule of "individualized
justice." Under this rule the judge is a new type of decision oker and can no longer perform in the accustomed
"legal" knowledge and training.
Multitude of Roles
As a dispenser of "individualized justice," he is forced
into a multitude of roles based on "working with people."
In this position he is handed a whole new set of problems
in trying to define his job and in determining how to handle
it. The new factors fall into three categories. (I) The problem of the new "facts"; (2) The problem of the judge's own
value system and (3) The problem of the value system of
others.
The Problem of the New Facts
For the traditional judge, the rules of law pretty well
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solve the problem of the facts. These rules not only limit
for him what facts may be presented to him as judge, but
they also define for him what are the legally relevant facts.
The evidence is presented in the court room and it normally
concerns objective and universally knowable behavior.
But the "new facts" are of a different sort. The judge,
if he is to "individualize justice" must obtain an almost unlimited range of rather strange data. He wants information
concerning the personality and abilities of the child. He
must have a valid picture of the child's environment, which
requires a wealth of information on the child's home, his
friends, his school and his neighborhood.
All of this data is crucial to the problem of causation.
Causation is crucial since the final "new fact," and probably
the most difficult to obtain, is how this particular child will
respond to the various "treatments" available to the judge.
Under the new system, then, the "facts" are not those
obtainable from witnesses in the court room, but must be
obtained from "experts," These experts, be they from the
courts own staff or from outside agencies, are not under any
real control of the court and, since they are experts, the
judge has no effective way to cross-examine their statement
as to the facts. In other words when trying to evaluate the
"needs" of the child and the efficacy of the "treatment" the
judge must rely on other people--other people who, as a
practical matter, cannot be checked.
Although many judges, not having experts available, are
often forced to try, it is no answer for the judge to attempt
to gather these facts for himself. What facts he obtains are
probably not the facts or at least not sufficient facts to
make a proper determination. The judge then, is forced
out of his traditional role as a legal decision maker into the
role of a decision maker whose decisions are, in any real
sense, determined for him by the "facts" presented by an
uneheckable expert. How, then, does the judge properly
define his role in this, at least for a judge, unique situation?
The Problem of the Judge's Values
When the legal system imposes the duty of "individualizing justice" on the judge, it is, in fact, allowing him the
widest type of judicial discretion. At best, "individualizing
justice" or even "obtaining a change of behavior to the
minimum societal standard," is but a vague guideline to the
exercise of discretion. Certainly giving the child the "care
.. and discipline . . civen by its parents" is an open invitation to invoke the judge's own sense of values
This open invitation presents many problems to the
judge. His owis personal convictions on such non-legal
issues as the need for personal morality, the importance of
compassion, the fear of naivete', all influence his attempt
to find the proper treatment for the child. His legal convictions on such matters as the need for a formalized hearing in order to obtain a "fair" hearing, the efficacy of
punishment, the legal concept of responsibility, and the
obligation to protect society will also influence his decision.
Compounding the problem is the fact that most people,
including most judges, have not consciously and rationally
examined their own set of values and how these values influence their decisions. And, even for those who have
many values are held on an unconscious level where rational
thought does not reach. The judge himself is the product
of his environment. How much must he unconsciously be
influenced by the way his parents treated him when he, in
turn, is acting as the "parent" to the delinquent child?
Not only do these values consciously or unconsciously
influence the judge when exercising discretion, but they
also may, in those areas where the juvenile code has established a criteria for judgment, present a sharp dilemma to
him- For instance, most judges would agree that there
should not be "responsibility" in an eight year old. But
what of a seventeen year old hood? The fact that someone
in the legislature down at the state capitol decided that
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responsibility starts at eighteen probably has but little influence on the judge who feels that for most children, responsibility starts at sixteen. Or what of the code's contentionthat the "crime" is irrelevant. Can the judge escape
his abhorrence of a brutal rape in determining "what's best
for the child," particularly when, as in some states, be can
transfer the case to the criminal court and when, in all
states, he has the duty of "protecting society?"
The point is not that the judge does "wrong" in letting
his personal sense of values effect the exercise of his discretion, but that these values are one more influence on the
judge and add a complicating factor to determining his role.
The Problem of the Value System of Others
In much the same manner, the value system of many
other people attempts to force the judge into a wide variety
of different roles. Due to the unique position of the Juvenile Court judge, he is forced into working with a large
variety of other people. Their value system leads them into
putting pressure on the court to induce the judge to play
the role that conforms to their value system. Consequently,
how the judge handles his job will continually be influenced
by the value system of these other people.
Without attempting to be exhaustive, some of these
"values" that may influence the
"others" and some of their
court might be listed as follows:
1. The Child: What does he expect of the judge? Does
he want the judge to be his "father" and control or even
"change" him? Or does he want the judge to be "fair" and
give punishment in equal measure to the "crime?" Does
he expect and invite the judge to prove once again that he
isa failure?S Do these expectations force the judge in or
out of the role of parens patriae?
2. The Parents: What do they expect of the Judge?
Do they identify with their child and expect the judge to
act like a judge-giving just punishment for the crime committed? Or do they merely want to be relieved of the responsibility of being parents and to have the judge take
over? Do they want to be exonerated for this child's behavior? "Judge, I have really tried but there is nothing I
can do with Johnny." Do they, perhaps, protect the child
against the alien world represented by the judge.7 How do
these demands affect the way the judge approaches his job?
3. The Court Staff and other "Social" Services: What
do they expect of the Judge? As "experts" do they demand
unquestioned acceptance of what they consider to be relevant "facts?" Do they push the court into the role of a
"yes" man to the probation officer or psychiatrist who
really makes the decision? Do they hope to turn the court
into a full-fledged social agency-an agency which would
be particularly useful since it exercises the coercive power
of the state? Do they hope that thejudge will strive toturn
adult rather than merely
the child into a mature, responsible
7
helping the child out of trouble? To what extent do these
pressures induce the court to attempt a more comprehensive
approach to children and/or to abdicate decision making to
his staff?
4. The Police and other Law Enforcement Agencies:
What do they expect of the judge? Do they want him to
exercise more "control" over the children in order that their
responsibility to keep- down "crime" and protect society is
made easier? Do they conceive of "delinquency" as their
prerogative, refusing, consequently, to refer cases to the
Juvenile Court? How does this pressure influence the
judge's perception of his job?
5. The Other Lawyers:S What do they expect of the
judge? Although lawyers seldom appear in the Juvenile
Court, do they demand a more "legalistic" approach when
they do appear? Since they have little contact with Juvenile
Courts, do they ignore the judge leaving him isolated with
his special problems? Do they show their respect and def-
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erence only when the judge sits, as he frequently does, as
a judge of some other court? Do they treat the judge
as
having deserted the "law" when he becomes a
Juvenile
Court judge? The values and preferences of this group
are
apt to have a profound effect on how the judge sees
his job.
Does the judge become more "lawyer-like" in order
to effectively remain a member of his professional group?
Does
he change his Juvenile Court procedure when there
are
lawyers present? From a longer range view, does the
judge
ignore the unrewarding juvenile portion of his job
in order
that he might advance to a "higher" general court with
more
prestige?
6. The Community as a Whole: What do they expect
of the judge? Here the values expressed to the court
may
range widely. Do some of the community delegate
the total
responsibility for delinquency to the court, expecting
the
judge to eliminate delinquency from the community
by acting as an omniscient social agency? Do other members
expect him to exercise greater control in order to
protect
society? How do these larger pressures affect the
judge's
view of his job, particularly in the situation where the
right
to continue in the position (and perhaps other judicial
positions as well) depends upon the community's vote?
The above list of pressure's illustrates some of the
wide
and divergent values held by those with whom the
judge
must work. Not only does the legal system and the
judge's
own values present inherent dilemmas, but various
groups
with which the judge, of necessity, comes into contact
also
push and pull the judge in several directions. These
conflicting pressures point up the fact that the judge
is faced
with the almost impossible task of defining his "proper"
role as the Juvenile Court judge.
Although many have written helpful, and sometimes
flicting, essays telling the judge what he ought and conought
9
not to do, the "proper" answer remains elusive.
This is
not to say that a definition is impossible for, a particular
judge at a particular time and place. Many Juvenile
Court
judges have been remarkably successful in working
out their
own definition. But all judges could probably improve.
Improvement could come, but it will not, from a change
in the
legal system or from a community consensus as to
the role
of the judge. Improvement can come from the judge
increasing his understanding of the basic conflict of
roles inherent in his job; from an increased insight into
his own
conscious or unconscious values; and from an increased
ability to understand and work with "others."
The National Council of Juvenile Court Judges in
their
Regional Institutes are attempting to offer an opportunity
to attending judges to improve these skills. The
Council
has chosen a proper avenue for improving the operation
of
the nation's Juvenile Courts.
FOOTNOTES
This article is based on a lecture presentation delivered
by the
author at the National Council of Juvenile Court Judges
Institute Il, held at Norman, Oklahoma, February 10-16,
1963.
Institute Ill was one of the programs staged under the
3
Council's
-year demonstration training program being developed
under
grant of the National Institute of Mental Health.
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Psychological and Personality Factors in
Delinquency
(Continued from Page 23)

home-life in childhood.

As yet there is no generally ac-

cepted psychological theory of the origins of this dimension,
so it is difficult to go beyond these findings.
The implication of the neurological evidence is that the
passage of time is a healer, and that not much can be done
to hurry the treatment up. Since this type of delayed maturity passes by the age 30, the solution might be to exercise
some kind of continuous supervision until people in this
category reached that age. From the socialization material
it appears that a firm supportive environment, probably
involving continucus relationships with other people,
has an
effect in strengthening ego-control. Again, this condition
is probably most nearly met in Approved Schools and
Borstals.
The Grants found that naval delinquents weak on their
"maturity" dimension, which is probably
similar to our
ego-control, responded less well to group therapy than
higher maturity delinquents. They also report the very
curious finding that these people did best with the predicted
worst supervision which was in fact least successful with the
high maturity subjects. Rudoff and Bennett found that
group counseling had least effect for young prisoners who
were high in anxiety and low on the CPI self-control scale.
It seems that counseling and group therapy do not
work for
those low in ego-control.
Lack of Sympathy
The origin of this condition is parental cruelty and neglect.
The psychometric findings suggest two possible psychological interpretations. Members of this group are definitely
weak in social perception, and this may be the
source of
their lack of sympathy-they simply cannot perceive
fully
the effects of their behavior on other people, or understand
the disapproval they are producing. If this is a fundamental
cause of their behavior, it might be possible to devise special
training methods to build up the missing skill.
A second possibility is that lack of sympathy is due to
lack
of basic social needs, such as the need for affiliation.
This
is supported by Loban's study (41) of 430 adolescents,
in
which scores on the Hawthorne test of cruelty-compassion
were found to be related to fear of rejection-usually
regarded as part of the need for affiliation. These needs
are
probably acquired in early infancy, and it may be
impossible
to learn them at a later age. However, the kind
of procedures which might be useful are to arrange
for satisfactory
experiences with the peer group, as can be obtained
in group
and milieu therapy. It is worth noticing that
this is precisely the opposite treatment to that recommended
for those
with deviant identifications.

